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1.0 Introduction: The Psychometric Paradigm
What do we know about the perception and acceptance of risk fromradiation and other
hazards and what are the implications of this knowledge for acceptance of radiation exposure in
space?
Research on perception and acceptance of risk had its origin in a stimulating article in
Science byC. Starr(1969) titled "Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk." Starr's paper
sought to develop a method for weighing technological risks against benefits to answer the
fundamental question, "How safe is safe enough?" His revealedpreference approach assumed
that, by trial and error, society arrives at ahessentially optimum balance between the risks and
benefits associated with any activity. Under this assumption, one may use historical or current risk
and benefit datato reveal patterns of "acceptable" risk/benefit trade-offs. Examining such datafor
eight industries and activities, Starr concluded that (a) acceptability of risk from anactivity is
roughly proportional to thethird power of thebenefits from that activity; (b) the public will
accept risks from voluntary activities (such as skiing) that are roughly 1,000 times aslarge as it
would tolerate from involuntary activities (such as food preservatives) that provide the same level
of benefits; and (c) the acceptable level of risk is inversely related to the number of persons
exposed to the risk.
My colleagues and I decided to replicate Starr's work by asking people directly about
their perceptionsof risk and benefits and their expressedpreferences for various kinds of
risk/benefit trade-offs. These studies, in what has come to be known as the "psychometric
paradigm," showed that expressed preferences also supported Starr's argument that people are
willing to tolerate higher risks from activities seen as highly beneficial. But, whereas Stan-
concluded thatvoluntariness of exposure was the key mediator of risk acceptance, expressed
. preference studies have shown that other (perceived) characteristics such as familiarity, control,
catastrophic potential, equity, andlevel of knowledge also seem to influence the relationship
between perceived risk, perceived benefit, and riskacceptance (Slovic, 1987).
Various models have been advanced to represent the relationships between perceptions,
behavior, and these qualitative characteristics of hazards. As we shall see, the picture that
emerges from this work is both orderly and complex.
1.1 Factor-Analytic Representations
Many of the perceived characteristics of risk are highly correlated across a wide range of
hazards. For example, hazards judged to be "voluntary" tend also to bejudged as "controllable"
and hazards whose adverse effects are delayed tend to be seen as posing risks that are not well
known. Investigation ofthese relationships by meansof factor analysis has shown that the
broader domain of characteristics can be condensed to a smaller set ofhigher-order characteristics
or factors.
The factor space presented inFigure 1 has been replicated across groups of lay people and
experts judging large and diverse sets of hazards. Factor 1, labeled "dread risk," is defined at its
high (right-hand) endby perceived lack of control, dread, catastrophic potential, fatal
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consequences, and the inequitable distribution of risks and benefits. Nuclear weapons and nuclear
reactor accidents score highest on the characteristics that make up this factor. Factor 2, labeled
"unknown risk," is defined at its high end by hazardsjudged to be unobservable, unknown, new,
and delayed in their manifestation ofharm. Chemical technologies score particularly high on this
factor. A third factor, reflecting the numberof people exposed to the risk, has been identified in
several studies. Making the set of hazards more or less specific (for example, partitioning nuclear
power into radioactive waste, uranium mining, and nuclear reactor accidents) has had little effect
on the factor structure or its relationship to risk perceptions.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Research has shownthat laypeople's risk perceptions and attitudesare closely related to
the position of a hazard withinthis type of factor space. Most important is the horizontal factor
"dread risk." Thehigher a hazard's score on thisfactor (the farther to the right it appears in the
space), the higher its perceived risk, the more people want to see its risks reduced, and the more
they want to see strict regulation employed to achieve the desired reduction in risk. In contrast,
experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to any ofthe various risk characteristics or
factors. Instead, as noted earlier, experts appear to see riskiness as synonymous withexpected
annual mortality. As a result, many conflicts concerning "risk" may result from experts and lay
people having different definitions of the concept.
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2.0 Perception of Radiation Risk
Numerous psychometric surveys conducted during the past decade have examined
perceptions of risk and benefit from various radiation technologies. This work shows that there is
no general pattern ofperception for radiation. Different sources of radiationexposure are
perceived in different ways. This was evident in the first psychometric study, summarized in Table
1. Therewe see that three groups of laypersons perceived nuclear power as having very high risk
(rank 1,1, and 8 out of 30 hazards) whereas a group of risk-assessment experts had a mean risk
rating that put nuclear power20th in thehierarchy. Note also that the three groups of laypersons
judged medical X rays relatively low in risk (ranks 22, 17, and 24), whereas the experts placed it
7th. Thus we see that two radiation technologies were perceived differently from one another and
differently from the views of experts.
Insert Table 1 about here
Figure 1 further illustrates the differences in perception ofvarious radiation hazards. Note
that nuclear reactor accidents, radioactive waste, and fallout from nuclearweapons testing are
located in the upper-right quadrant of the factor space, reflecting people's perceptions that these
technologies are uncontrollable, dread, catastrophic, lethal, and inequitablein their distribution of
risks and benefits. Diagnostic X rays are perceived much more favorably on these scales, hence
they fall in the upper-left quadrant of the space. Nuclearweapons fall in the lower-right quadrant,
separating from nuclear reactor accidents, nuclear waste, and fallout on the scales measuring
knowledge, immediacy of effects, and observability ofeffects.
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Although Table 1 and Figure 1 represent data from small and nonrepresentative samples
collected a decade or more ago, recent surveys of the general public in the U.S., Sweden, and
Canada show consistently that nuclear power and nuclear waste are perceived as extremely high
in risk and low in benefit to society, whereas medical X rays are perceived as very beneficial and
low in risk. Studies in Norway and Hungary have also obtained similar results.
The powerful negative imagery evoked by nuclear power and radiation is discussed from a
historical perspective by Weart (1988). Weart argues that modern thinking about radiation
employs beliefs and symbols that have been associated for centuries with the concept of
transmutation—the passage through destruction to rebirth. In the early decades of the 20th
century, transmutation images became centered on radiation, which was associated with "uncanny
rays that brought hideous death or miraculous new life; with mad scientists and their ambiguous
monsters; with cosmic secrets of life and death;. . . and with weapons great enough to destroy the
world. . . " (p. 42).
But this concept of transmutation has a duality that is hardly evident in the imagery
associated with nuclear power and nuclear wastes. Why has the evil overwhelmed the good? The
answer undoubtedly involves the bombing ofHiroshima and Nagasaki, which linked the dread
images to reality.
Additional insights into the special quality of nuclear fear are provided by Erikson (1990),
who draws attention to the broad, emerging theme of toxicity, both radioactive and chemical, that
characterizes a "whole new species of trouble" associated with modern technological disasters.
Erikson describes the exceptionally dreadquality of technological accidents that expose people to
radiation and chemicals in ways that "contaminate rather than merely damage;. . . pollute, befoul,
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and taint rather than just create wreckage;. . . penetrate human tissue indirectly rather than
wound the surface by assaults of a more straightforward kind" (p. 120). Unlike natural disasters,
these accidents are unbounded. Unlike conventional disaster plots, they have no end.
Invisible contaminants remain a part of the surroundings—absorbed into the grain of the
landscape, the tissues of the body, and, worst of all, into the genetic material of the
survivors. An "all clear" is never sounded. The book of accounts is never closed, (p. 121)
Erikson's "contamination model" may explain, in part, the reaction of the public to
exposures to carcinogens. Numerous studies have found that a high percentage (60 - 75%) of
people believe that if a person is exposed to a chemical that can cause cancer, that person will
probably get cancer some day. A similarly high percentage believe that "exposure to radiation will
probably lead to cancer some day." The belief that any exposure to a carcinogen is likelyto lead
to cancer tends to coincide with the belief that it can never be too expensive to reduce such risks.
Therefore, in an analysis by Tengs et al. (1995) ofmore than 500 life-saving interventions it is not
surprising to find that radiation controls in industry were associated with the highest costs per
year of life saved.
Table 2 summarizes the status of perceived risk for six radiation technologies, contrasting
the views of technical experts with the views of the general public. In addition to nuclear power,
nuclear waste, X rays, radon, and nuclear weapons, food irradiation (Bord & O'Connor, 1990),
and electric and magnetic fields (EMF—a source of non-ionizing radiation), are included in the
table, although there is relatively less information about perceptions of these two sources. We see
that there is typically disagreement between the expertsand the public regarding the level of risk
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and its acceptability. To my knowledge there have been only two published studies thus far of
perceptions of risk from electric and magnetic fields. Both of these studies, by Morgan et al.
(1985) and MacGregor, Slovic, and Morgan (1994), found that perceived risks associated with
fields from home appliances and electric blankets were relatively low, and that perceived risks
associated with large power lines were relatively high. Both studies also showed that, when the
respondents were given a briefing about research on health effects of electric fields (which said
that many studies had been done but no adverse human health effects had yet been reliably
demonstrated), their perceptions on subsequent retest shifted toward higher perceived risk.
MacGregor et al. found that this briefing (in the form of a brochure) also led to greater dread
(particularly regarding power-line risks), less perceived equity, and increased concern regarding
effects ofEMF on the nervous system, the immune system, cell growth and reproduction, chronic
depression, and cancer.
Insert Table 2 about here
2.1 Lessons
What does this psychometric research tell us about the acceptance of risk from radiation?
There seem to be several lessons:
First, although many technical experts have labeled public reactions as irrational or phobic,
such accusations are clearly unjustified (Drottz-Sjoberg & Persson, 1993). There is a logic to
public perceptions and behaviors that has become apparent through research. For example, the
acceptance afforded X rays suggests that acceptance of risk is conditioned byperceptions of
direct benefits and by trust in the managers of the technology, in this case the medical profession.
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The managers of nuclear-power technologies are clearly less trusted and the benefits of this
technology are not highly appreciated, hence their risks are less acceptable. High risks from
nuclear weapons are tolerated because of their perceived necessity (and probably also because
people lack knowledge about howto intervene in military security issues; they do have such
knowledge and opportunities to intervene in the management of nuclearpower).
The apathetic response to the risk from radon appears to result from the fact that it is of
natural origin, occurring in a comfortable, familiar setting, with no one to blame. Moreover, it can
never be totally eliminated.
3.0 Risk Acceptance on the Mountaintop and in the Workplace
As shown above, psychometric surveys can give us insights into the determinants of
perceived andacceptable risk from a wide variety of hazardous activities. But what about space
flight in particular? Are astronauts adventurers, explorers, or workers, or all of these
simultaneously? Certainly there are some missions that are more exploratory andmore
adventurous than others, a trip to Mars comesfirst to my mind as an example. In this perspective,
we might lookfor guidance in the acceptance of risk from some of the most dangerous terrestrial
activities—such as high-altitude mountain climbing. It is said that about one in ten Everest
climbers dies in the attempt; just a few weeks ago eight climberslost their lives on Everest in a
severe storm. Everest climbers, and society, obviouslyaccept a high level ofknown risk from a
voluntary activity that is challenging and highly satisfying to the participants. To the extentthat
astronauts areadventurers and explorers voluntarily accepting known risks, the threshold of
acceptability should be high—as it is for mountain climbers.
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On the other hand, astronauts are also workers, and in the future more of their activities
will be "routine"—maintaining a space station, for example. When we think of astronauts as
workers, we may gain insight into acceptance of risk from a book that Dorothy Nelkin and
Michael Brown published titled Workers at Risk: Voicesfrom the Workplace (Nelkin & Brown,
1984).
Nelkin and Brown interviewed 75 workers from a wide variety of occupations, all of
whom were exposed to rather dangerous chemicals. The book is a qualitative description of these
workers' attempts to cope with the fact that their occupations put them in dailycontact with
dangerous substances. I think that this study definitely has relevance for the astronauts' situations.
Nelkin and Brown observed that there were tremendously diverse reactions ofworkers to these
chemical exposures, from very negative, hostile reactions among some workers to others who
were really quite comfortable with the
exposures, feeling that "It's worth the risk"
"It's Worth the Risk"
(see box). They found that people in highly A number of people, mainly those in
professional and skilledjobs, told us frankly
professional and skilledjobs (like astronauts) that their work was "worth the risks."
Aware of the hazards, they accept them as
tended to feel that their work was worth the a trade-off for the personally gratifying
benefits of their jobs. While often very
risks. Such individuals found the benefits high careful to protect themselves, they measure
the risks against the satisfaction of their
(again we see the relationship between work and the priorities of their careers. Fire
fighters feel the risks are small compared to
perceived benefit and acceptance of risk), and the satisfaction of saving lives. A deck hand
is willing to take risks because she values
the work very satisfying They tended to her autonomy. Artists value the
opportunities for creativity. A painter and a
downplay or deny the risk and reallywere not rose gardener love the aesthetic quality of
their jobs.
dwelling on it as did those who did not like From Nelkin and Brown (1984, p. 97).
9 Perception and Acceptance of Ris k
their employment. Nevertheless, despite the fact that somepeoplewere very comfortable with the
risks of their job, the overall message that Nelkin and Brown took from this extensive series of
interviews was that workplace hazard is a serious concern to those at risk.
Nelkin and Brown (1984) concluded:
Hearing these voices, we believe they carry a critical message—that the pervasive
presence of chemical risksin the workplace has profound human costs in terms of anxiety
. as wellas of illness. With the proliferation of chemicals in so many occupations, such
concerns are likely to have an increasing effect on collective bargaining, on compensation
claims, and on the general morale of the work force. Thus the voices ofworkers, their
identification of problems, their insights, and their views must be heard. They are critical
to the creation of a more humane working environment, (p. 183)
I certainly believe that we need to take this perspective with regard to our astronauts as
well, and to listen to their concerns about safety.
4.0 Some Concluding Remarks About Acceptance of Radiation Risks in Space
There is no magic formula that leads us to a precise level of acceptable risk from exposure
to radiation in space/Acceptable risk levels evolve through a process of negotiation that must
integrate a large number of social, technical, and economic factors. The research described above
indicates many of the factors that are important in this context. Some of them lead to a high
degree of tolerance for radiation risk; others to a low degree of tolerance.
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4.1 The Nature of the Hazard Implies a High Degree of Tolerance or Acceptance
Just because the hazard is radiation doesn't mean that exposure cannot be tolerated. We
have seen that public reaction to radiation exposure varies widely, depending upon the context of
that exposure (seeTable 2). Radiation in space is a natural phenomenon andwe find that people
are much more tolerant of voluntary natural exposures thanto exposures imposed upon themby
industry or some other human activity. Second, thisvoluntary exposure cannot be totally
eliminated, much as is the case with radon. Third, the risk is latent, unobservable, and small
compared to the more immediate risk of accident or failure to accomplish the mission objectives.
The chronic, latent, unobservable property of radiation risk means that there will be less pressure
to minimize it, in contrast to the reaction after a majoraccident (e.g., the Challenger disaster).
The social context also fosters a high tolerance for risk in space because the work is
exciting, challenging, sociallyvisible, satisfying, and valuable, much as Nelkin and Brown's
firefighters who, when interviewed, said that they don't care about the risks from chemical
exposures in fires because they are saving people's lives. In addition, I would assume that
astronauts have a lot of confidence in the overall system in which theywork and identify with
NASA's organizational goals and this, too, leads to tolerance for risk. Astronauts are skilled
professionals. They are also self-confident individuals, who tend to be listened to and cared about
and have been successful takers of calculated risks throughout their careers. So, high levels of risk
from radiation in space could bejustified and probably would be accepted by all involved.
But we have to also be cognizant of the fact that the values of the astronauts may change
over time and as their active flight careers wind down, they might develop a different perspective
on the risks from the radiation to which they'vebeen exposed. Society's values may change as
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well. We have seen occupational risk levels declining steadily over time due to pressure to make
things safer. Thus the value systems that are important to the social negotiation of acceptable risk
are not stable. As the number of persons exposed to risk increases, we find that tolerance for risk
tends to decrease (Starr, 1969). Finally, anynoticeable above-normal incidence of cancer among
former astronauts could cause problems not only for the astronauts but in terms of the
stigmatization of the professionand criticism ofNASA's protection of its astronauts. And one
might expect that astronauts, being rather fit individuals, might have a lower incidenceof
cardiovascular disease, which means that their base level of cancer mightbe high and that any
additional cancerburdenfrom radiation could leadto a noticeably higher degree of canceramong
older astronauts. These are just a few of the complexities in terms ofperception of risk which are
relevant to the social negotiation of acceptable riskand I hope that whenwe hear the perspectives
of the astronauts later this afternoon we can perhaps return to someof these issues. Thankyou.
Question and Answer Session
Q. I'm AmyKronenberg. I'm at the LawrenceBerkeleyLaboratory. I really enjoyed the
presentations and the session. I'm not sure who I should address this question to, but there was an
article in last Sunday's New York Times magazine section about private missions to Mars. One of
the factors that this article, and your example of people climbing Mt. Everest brought to mind is
that the choice of an occupation or a task as an explorer maybe perceived very differently based
on the cost, the literalcost, to society as a whole. The choice of an individual to go on an Everest
expedition financed privately may be seen differently than the cost of a space flight funded
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publicly versus the cost of the space flight funded privately. So the risk perception might be
different, as well as the acceptability of the risk. Would like to comment on that?
A. That is clearly a relevant factor as a general issue. We even see that there are pressures
withinthe mountaineering professionto see this as something that the public is involved in. That
is, if rescuers have to risktheir lives and spend a lot of money to rescue people, then that changes
the picture and maybe we should regulate mountain climbing more strictly. Those are real
pressures in that direction. But I think also that the radiation hazard is not so visible. I mean in
climbing, the accidents are visible and dramatic and everyone gets excited about them. In contrast,
we're talking here about something very subtle, hidden, unobservable and I don't know that we're
going to, at least for a long time, be aware of some of the differences in" the levels of risk that we
are talking about so I don't know that those pressures would necessarily surface in the sameway.
Q. I'm Stan Curtis from the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center. This is a question
to both Dr. Whipple and Dr. Slovic. It cameto mind as I was listening to Dr. Slovic that we have
had discussions about considering two different astronaut groups. One would be the ones who
wouldgo up and construct the spacestation. Theymight be considered to fall in what might be
called the "worker" category. An then there is a second group—those who might undertake a
return trip to the moon or a mission to Mars. These people might be considered to fall in what
might be called the "explorer" category. My question is whether we should consider developing
and applying two different levels of acceptable risk to these two groups? Would either of the last
two speakers comment on this?
A. I think that there is a sense in which it would be legitimate to make that distinction
because peoplethemselves might make a distinction betweenroutinework and exploration. As
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part of this social negotiation we could say that, if you're really exploring, you should be allowed
to bear a greater risk. But then we get into definitions. People who are building a space station
would also be considered explorers by many. So I think we'd have to negotiate that distinction. If
there was a clear distinction between routine work versus unique, interplanetaryexploration, then
I think it fits with everything else we do in society where we have different tolerances as a
function of the value and the benefits and so forth. But we'll have to think hard about this
distinction.
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Table 1.
Ordering of perceived risks for 30 activities and technologies. The ordering is based on the




Activity or Technology Voters Students Members Experts
Nuclear power 1 1 8 20
Motor vehicles 2 5 3 1
Handguns 3 2 1 4
Smoking 4 3 4 2
Motorcycles 5 6 2 6
Alcoholic Beverages 6 7 5 3
General (private) aviation 7 . 15 11 12
Police work 8 8 7 17
Pesticides 9 4 15 8
Surgery 10 11 9 5
Fire fighting 11 10 6 18
Large construction 12 14 13 13
Hunting 13 18 10 23
Spray cans 14 13 23 26
Mountain climbing 15 22 12 29
Bicycles 16 24 14 15
Commercial aviation 17 16 18 16
Electric power (non-nuclear) 18 19 19 9
Swimming 19 30 17 10
-' Contraceptives 20 9 22 11
Skiing 21 25 16 30
X-rays 22 17 24 7
High school and college football 23 26 21 27
Railroads 24 23 20 19
Food preservatives 25 12 28 14
Food coloring 26 20 30 21
Power mowers 27 28 25 28
Prescription antibiotics 28 21 26 24
Home appliances 29 27 27 22
Vaccinations 30 29 29 25
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Table 2.
Summary ofPerception and Acceptance ofRisks From Diverse Sources ofRadiation Exposure
Perceived risk
Technical experts Public












Nuclear weapons Moderate to extreme risk Extreme risk
Tolerance Tolerance
Food irradiation Low risk
Acceptable
Moderate to high risk
Acceptability questioned
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Location of 81 hazards on Factors 1 and 2 derived from the interrelationships
among 15 risk characteristics. Each factor is made up of a combination of characteristics, as
indicated by the lower diagram. Source: redrawn from Slovic (1987).
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